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ECONOMIC WARFARE - THE ATTACK 
A lecture delivered by 
Prof. Charles Cortez Abbott 
at the Naval War College 
October 21, 1948 
Professor Spiegel in his book, The Economics of Total War, 
defines this subject as follows: 
"Economic warfare is designed to destroy the enemy's 
economic war potential by physically destroying war es-
sential assets and by blockading supplies from abroad ........ " 
It "requires the coordinated blending of military and econ­
omic measures." 
Colonel Clabaugh of the faculty of the Industrial College of 
the Armed Forces in a recent lecture in that college's Economic 
Mobilization course said: 
" ...... so far as the literal and figurative meaning of the 
words is concerned, the term 'economic warfare' could have 
been applied to economic mobilization for war or to pro­
duction or even to commercial rivalry in peace. But cus­
tom and usage make language as well as law. Long before 
we entered the war, in fact before the outbreak of war in 
Europe, economic warfare had come to mean the strangula­
tion of the enemy-blockade, literally, by ships at sea and 
figuratively, by diplomatic and economic measures. 'Econ­
omic warfare' should be used only in the special meaning 
given to it by custom and usage ....... ,Briefly, it is 'the sum 
of all those measures which injure the enemy's war po­
tential.' " 
In order to place economic warfare in some perspective, it 
may serve a useful purpose at this point to make a number of ob­
servations regarding it. Economic warfare of course is not a new 
Professor. Abbott has been on the faculty of Harvard University 
since 1932-for the past several years as Professor of Business 
Economics. 
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development. It is probably as old as warfare itself. Certainly in 
Plutarch's account of the wars of the Greeks and the Persians 
there are numerous happenings which we would characterize as fall­
ing within the orbit of economic warfare. In the Napoleonic wars 
measures of ,economic attack and defense played a prominent part, 
and in our own Civil War the blockade of the South was of very 
great consequence. 
With the passage of time, the realignment of nations, and 
the development of new weapons, economic warfare continually 
changes its form. The development of air power and of submarine 
warfare has of. course greatly widened its scope and objectives. On 
the other hand, total war on a global scale has tended to diminish the 
feasibility of naval blockade in the older, narrower sense of blockad­
ing a hostile coast line and has fostered a growth of new measures 
which I will speak of in a moment. 
It has been commonly observed that economic warfare en­
compasses many ordinary peacetime practices of business, such as 
foreign investment; patent interchange agreements,establishment of 
branch plants.in foreign countries, and commercial relationships of 
many kinds. At the other extreme are operations of a strictly mili­
tary character, undertaken in wartime., that possess an economic 
purpose, such as submarine warfare and the air attacks on the Ger­
man synthetic oil plants at Leuna in the last war. In between these 
extremes come such operations as our efforts to deprive the Axis of 
Spanish and Portuguese wolfram through preclusive buying, or our 
efforts through the use of ship warrants and denial of bunkering 
facilities to force the Argentines to employ their merchant tonnage 
in shipping services advantageous to us. 
In general, the effectiveness of economic warfare increases 
or decreases directly in proportion to the military strength and suc­
cess of the nation or alliance. Many illustrations of the validity of 
6 
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this proposition can be found. For example, the character of the 
trade agreements which the United States was able to negotiate 
with neutrals-Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey­
changed rapidly and in our favor between 1942 and 1944 as allied 
military successes increased. As fortune favored our arms it was 
possible to put increasing pressure on neutral countries and areas 
and, consequently, progressively to deprive the Axis of essential raw 
materials. This observation perhaps is nothing more than a further 
confirmation of the fact that economic warfare in itself can probab­
ly never be a decisive factor independent of military action, although 
it can very substantially contribute to military successes. 
Probably economic warfare is most successful when a partic­
ular action is undertaken on such a �cale and so rapidly that the 
economy attacked has no chance to accommodate itself to the blow 
or to develop substitute materials or alternative trade routes or con­
nections, with the result that the effects of a sudden and unexpected 
action tend to become cumulative. If the country is suddenly and 
completely cut off from some item such as ball bearings, or if all 
foreign trade relationships with neutrals are swiftly and violently 
distorted, the effects on a country's economy will be very far reach­
ing, particularly in a military sense. Reasoning of this type is of 
course one of the bases for apprehension regarding a sneak attack 
on industrial areas in the United States. 
On the other hand, it is easy to overestimate the effects of 
particular operations designed to accomplish economic dislocation. 
The strategic bombing of German industry and transport prior to 
the spring of 1944, for example, seemingly injured the German 
economy much less than was currently believed in this cou�try. A
commonly quoted judgment of one of the officials of the British 
Ministry of Economic Warfare is to the effect that MEW did not un­
derestimate Germany's needs or resources, but that German in-
7 
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genuity in developing substitutes for critical materials and com­
ponents was greatly underestimated. 
It is clear, of course, that there are two bases for economic 
warfare. The first may be described as the economic and business 
facts characteristic of a nation's economy. Economic and commer­
cial geography, sources of raw materials, peacetime trade flows, 
commercial and banking connections of important companies, the 
location of key plants and industries-these determine the points in 
a nation's position that are susceptible to economic attack. Great 
Britain, for example, was vulnerable to a food shortage; Nazi Ger­
many was vulnerable to a shortage of gasoline. The second basis 
is economic intelligence, or knowledge of these facts. The focus of 
such intelligence must be to determine the shortages that exist in the 
economy at the outbreak of war or that appear during hostilities. 
In order to prosecute economic warfare successfully the ne­
cessity for the collection, collation, and analysis of economic in­
telligence is self-evident. Its importance can hardly be overesti­
mated and it is essential in every phase of this type of operation, 
from the selection of targets for strategic bombing to knowledge of 
shortages in the enemy's territory. 
A great deal, probably a major portion, of the information 
needed for an effective system of economic intelligence can be 
gleaned from published sources. The problem is one of organ­
izing to do the job, especially in peacetime. In the last war there 
was a great deal of overlapping, confusion, and duplication among 
the agencies concerned with this task, and there is no question 
that far too much time elapsed before an effective economic in­
telligence organization was achieved. The inescapable conclusion 
is that much of the job of collecting economic intelligence can and 
should be done prior to the outbreak of hostilities. 
8 
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A very large part though perhaps not all of the necessary 
information that is not available from published sources prob­
ably exists in the files of government · departments and of busi­
ness concerns in this country. The logic of the problem of as­
sembling data for economic warfare requires that any particu­
lar country base its intelligence system on the organizations and 
sources of information at its command. (Traditionally, Great 
Britain has used shipping concerns, banks, foreign trade con­
nections, and its control of the international news orgahizations 
for this purpose, in addition to its diplomatic and consular repre­
sentatives; Germany, as we all know, used German companies or 
plants located abroad, patent interchange agreements, and the 
various kinds of German emigrant societies; Russia clearly uses 
the Communist Party and its fellow travelers for this purpose). 
It is doubtful if any systematic effort has been made to collect and 
collate information in the hands of leading American business 
corporations with far-flung foreign connections, such as the large 
banks, General Motors, Standard of New Jersey, International 
Harvester, and so on. The omission is a matter of great regret, 
since if such information were collected and collated it would 
certainly be very comprehensive. 
The need for this kind of effort appears to be the greater 
since, insofar as I understand thei:;e matters, there is relatively 
little knowledge of the workings of the Russian economy in this 
country, at least as compared with other major powers. This lack 
of an integrated body of data makes offensive economic warfare 
against the Soviet considerably more difficult than would other­
wise be the case. Incidentally, I believe that careful analysis of 
the trade agreements that Russia has concluded since V-J Day, 
and is concluding, both with countries inside and with countries 
outside the Iron Curtain, should be one of the more fruitful 
sources of this kind of knowledge, in that such agreements might 
suggest actual or potential shortages in the Russian economy. 
9 
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We come now to the techniques of economic warfare-block­
ade, export licensing, preclusive buying, control of shipping, black­
lists, blocking of foreign assets, and all the rest. 
Historically, the backbone of economic warfare has been the 
naval blockade in the strict sense of the word. Reliance has been 
placed on the stationing of naval vessels on an enemy coast and out­
side enemy harbors, on patrol of the sea lanes, on observation of ship­
ping in neutral roa:dsteads, and on the careful designation of contra­
band and, when possible, its seizure. During the two World Wars 
this pattern has been altered by three well-defined developments. 
The first was the growth of the navicert system, a system which re­
sultE!d in great economies in the use of warships in supervising neu­
tral shipping .. The second has been the development of the long dis­
tance or paper blockade, which in its more advanced form seeks not 
only to cut off all supplies for the enemy at the point of origin, 
namely, in neutral countries, but even goes so far as to mould the 
economy of neutral territory to your own use. The third circum­
stance has been the breakdown of distinctions between contraband 
and noncontraband goods, whatever the lawyers may say. 
The reasons for these changes are clear. Global warfare and 
conflicts between world-wide alliances, together with the develop­
ment of new weapons such as the airplane and the submarine, have 
greatly increased the need for employing naval vessels in strictly 
naval operations and on convoy duty.. Conversely, the amount of 
naval vessels' time available for blockade purposes has been re­
duced. Furthermore, the larger the land mass and the volume of 
resources controlled by the enemy, the fewer are the objectives that 
can be achieved by a close blockade. The number of strategic items 
in short supply for the Nazis in 1942 was really very small­
petroleum was perhaps the only item in which shortage ever be­
came acute. Moreover, the logics of total war on a global scale 
10 
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make useless any distinctions between contraband and noncontra­
band items. Finally, the necessities of total war require that a 
combatant. not only devote all of his resources to the war effort but 
also, so far as is possible, compel neutral nations to devote their 
resources also to purposes advantageous to him. In pursuit of this 
objective the combatant, of course, makes use of shipping con­
trols, trade agreements, preclusive buying, financial measures, and 
any other procedures available to him·. 
An ancillary purpose sought in the effort to control the 
trade of neutrals is to deprive the enemy of any advantages of trade 
with other countries or the use of any assets that he owns located 
outside his own boundaries. The ultimate goal is to deprive him of 
the benefits that arise from the fact that he is a member of a com­
munity of nations. 
With reference to the navicert system, . it should be pointed 
out that the Navy has three, perhaps four functions to perform un­
der this procedure: the issue of the navicert, although this can per­
haps be done by other agencies; apprehension of blockade runners; 
the enforcement of the rules of blockade at control points; and per­
iodic spot checks of merchant vessels on the high seas to ensure that 
the 
I 
blockade rules are being observed. 
Should a condition of open hostilities develop between· this 
country and the Soviet there can be little doubt that the measures of 
economic warfare existing at the end of World War II would be 
quickly reimposed. The export control measures which, as you 
know, were originally instituted under the Export Control Act of 
July, 1940 as a means of conserving scarce items, would be re­
instituted. They would be reimposed partly for their original pur­
pose of conservation, partly as a means of putting pressure on and 
bargaining with neutral areas or with areas producing resources 
11 
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essential to our own effort, and partly to ensure that no products of 
American fabrication were exported and fell into enemy hands. 
War Trade Agreements, which are essentially a mechanism 
for rationing noncombatant areas and for bringing the operation 
of their economies into conformance with your own needs, would be 
quickly negotiated. The rationing of neutral or noncombatant areas 
has a number of separate aspects, each one of which merits atten­
tion. In the first place, you cannot afford to give these areas all 
they want of many commodities, or even all the shipping space that 
they want. In the last war, the East Coast of South America was 
not only severely rationed as regards its receipts of newsprint and 
steel but also as regards shipping space allocated to it. In the 
second place, it is important that only the essential needs of neutral 
areas be satisfied; otherwise it is entirely possible that scarce items 
may be reexported to the enemy. In the third place, rationing of 
the items that these areas want from you is the best lever for as­
suring that you get the supplies from them that are needed in your 
war program. In the last war it was made very explicit by the 
Belgian Congo that continued shipments of scarce minerals, fats 
and oils and fibers were contingent upon the Congo's receipt of 
manufactured goods and such picturesque items as. old clothes and 
tinware essential for trade with the natives. 
The injury to the Russian war effort that such measures 
might inflict would in general be determined by the extent to 
which the Russian economy and war potential is dependent upon 
imports of raw materials, components, and technical skills from 
abroad. I will not attempt to appraise this matter, since the Rus­
sian war potential is the subject of another lecture in your course. 
I would like to suggest, however, that the effect of these 
measures might be influenced to some extent by another factor, 
namely, the amount of territory controlled by the Russians. The 
12 
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greater the size of the land mass controlled by a military . economy 
the less it tends to be subject to the pressures of economic warfare. 
When Nazi Germany overran Poland, the Balkans, and Norway she 
greatly increased the resources at her command, not the least of 
which was man power. On the other hand, the addition of terri­
tory may lead to greater shortages of certain kinds. For example, 
Holland is a deficit food area, and the fact that the Nazis overran 
the Netherlands must have increased the pressure on their own food 
supplies. One may presume that the use of French industrial ca­
pacity by the Germans increased the pressure on German petrol­
eum resources. The fact that the United States welded Latin 
America to our war economy-insofar as we did-required that we 
supply Latin America with minimum amounts of shipping services, 
newsprint, flour and so forth. As is well known, our efforts to 
service the Caribbean and the East Coast of South America re­
sulted in a number of submarine sinkings that might not other­
wise have taken place and consequently intensified the shortage of 
merchant shipping. In short, if Russia overran Western Europe 
it would increase her war potential, but it would also increase her 
vulnerability to certain types of economic pressure, though prob­
ably not in equal degree. 
If war between the United States and the Soviet should 
break ou:t, the long distance or so-called paper blockade, with its 
three basic instruments, the navicert, the ship's navicert, and the 
ship's warrant, would certainly be imposed immediately. 
As you know, the navicert originated in the First World 
War while the United States was still a neutral. It was originally 
a device for expediting the shipment of noncontraband goods from 
one neutral country to another, a sort of permit for passage through 
the blockade, given at the point of origin. It speedily developed 
into a system of controlling all goods passing in trade between the 
neutral countries. 
18 
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A ship's navicert which was a logical outgrowth of the 
navicert for a particular consignment, was given when all the items 
in a ship's .manifest had been navicerted, and permitted a vessel 
to make a single voyage through naval controls. The ship's navi­
cert provided a description of the ship and its proposed itinerary; 
a list of officers, crew, and passengers; a description of the cargo
? 
ship's stores, mail, and .money; and an account of the source, des­
tination, consignor, and consignee of the cargo. When the appli­
cation for a ship's navicert was received, the crew and passenger 
lists were checked, and 09jectionable persons were removed before 
the issue of the navicert. The effect of the navicert system was that 
all unnavicerted ships and cargo became subject to immediate 
seizure. 
A ship's warrant entitled a vessel to the use of British and 
Allied port facilities-bunkering, ship stores, repairs, and so forth. 
In order to receive a warrant the owner agreed that no vessel 
owned or operated by him would sail to or from the navicert area 
without a ship's navicert, that he would not sell or part with ef­
fective control of any vessel owned by him without the approval of 
the proper authorities, and that he would not employ any enemy 
company for the purpose of obtaining insurance or other facil­
ities. In addition, fleet owners were generally required to charter 
portions of their fleets to the issuing authority; in the last war 
that meant either the British Ministry of War Transport or the War 
Shipping Administration. I have always been under the im­
pression that the presence of Swedish vessels in the Pacific in 
services designated by the British was a result of this kind of lever 
on neutral shipping. 
The extent to which the imposition of shipping controls may 
directly jnjure the Soviets seems to me very problematical. On the 
other hand, the use of these controls would clearly increase the re-
14 
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sources at the command of this country and of 0-reat Britain, and 
it is in this respect that they would be chiefly useful. 
If the cold war should turn into a hot war, it seems certain 
that proclaimed lists of individuals and of business concerns com­
mercially "untouchable" would be speedily developed and that Rus­
sian-owned funds and other assets in territories under our control 
would be sequestered. Here again the direct injury to the Russians 
would be doubtful. Certainly there would be no important body of 
Russian assets owned in t�is country to sequester-nothing like 
the $7,955,000,000 of assets that were blocked in this court try dur­
ing the last war. 
In short, the ocean-borne commerce of Russia, particularly 
that part that could be reached by the navicert system or the pro­
claimed list, seems to be very important to the Soviet. Her land 
bounµaries to the Near East and the Far East would be difficult if 
not impossible to seal through measures of economic warfare. The 
conclusion is, I think, that strategic bombing would be far more 
effective in breaking down the Russian war potential than would 
these other mechanisms. 
By way of conclusion let us consider some of the economic 
aspects of the cold war. These considerations are important on 
their own merits. More importantly, the· degree of success with 
which the United States and the Soviets prosecute their respective 
programs of economic warfare prior to the time hostilities break 
out-if they do-will greatly influence the possibilities of economic 
warfare after the event. 
The general pattern is clear. The Soviets have their policy 
of economic erosion; the United States has the Marshall Plan. 
The chief, the most interesting, and the most baffling charac-
15 
11
Abbott: Economic Warfare - The Attack
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
teristic of the Russian policy is its destructive character. The 
erosion, undermining and· collapse of other economies serves the 
Soviet purpose. Only in minor degree, apparently, are the Russians 
interested in preserving the productive capacity or trade connections 
of territories under their control and in adapting these facilities 
for their own use. In this respect Russian policy largely differs 
from other types of economic penetration that the world has seen. 
On the whole, and notwithstanding some well-known exceptions, 
the British and the Germans have traditionally sought to pre­
serve the economic potential of an area being penetrated, and 
even to build upon it. Their purpose for the most part was to 
turn the productive capacity and facilities in such territories to 
their own use, not to destroy them. 
As I have said, Russian policy is furthered by .the spread 
of economic chaos, by civil disturbance, the diminution of production 
and trade, inflation of currency, dislocation of channels of trade, 
and the disappearance of plants and individual business concerI).s. 
One of my friends points out that the Russians are masters of 
"economic cannibalism," the absorption or destruction. of econ­
omic activity outside Russia, leaving the Russian economy, poor 
as it may be, without a rival. 
In this policy, especially in its early stages, manipulation of 
the monetary and banking· structure is a key element. As we all 
know, inflation of the currency and prostitution of the banking 
syste:r:n in a given a!:ea is the quickest way to check the economic 
processes of production and distribution and to discourage. busi­
nessmen and the spirit of enterprise. The importance of money 
and credit was recognized by Lenin. Both Nazis and Communists 
have used control of money and banking mechanisms as a means 
of breaking down the economies of satellite, peripheral states, and
the position that control of the currency has assumed in the Ber­
lin situation seems to be not wholly accidental. 
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As against this program the United States has as a counter­
measure the Marshall Plan, with all the implications and ramifica­
tions covered by that phrase. It is commonly said that this plan 
is designed for the economic restoration of Europe, but this seems 
to be not a wholly adequate statement. In an immediate sense the 
plan was designed to check economic deterioration in western 
Europe; in a larger sense it is presumably intended to restore an 
economic balance of power in Europe, a sine qua non of the restora­
tion of a military balance of power. 
Certain aspects of the Marshall Plan, however, particularly 
aspects that are significant under economic warfare, I do not think 
are fully appreciated. In what I am about to say I am relying 
chiefly on three very competent documents: A Survey of the 
Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe, United Nations 
Eco.nomic Commission for Europe, Geneva, March 30, 1948; a sup­
plementary document published by the same source, Selected World 
Economic Indices, Lake Success, July, 1948; and The Eighteenth 
Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements, pub-· 
lished at Basie, Switzerland, June 14, 1948. 
It does not seem to be valid to look on the Marshall Plan as 
a means of restoring European industrial production to prewar 
levels. Such a restoration had in fact been substantially achieved 
before the end of 1947. Industrial production of 14 major nations 
of Europe, excluding Germany, in the latter half of that year was 
on the average 99% of prewar production; 8 nations* which in 
1938 accounted for 34 % of European production had exceeded 
prewar output, in some instances by considerable margins. This 
level of production seems to have been achieved in large measure 
because of the increased labor supply in Europe and by a more 
* Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Sweden
and the United Kingdom.
17 
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complete use of the supply than was the case in 1938, since 
European postwar output per man-hour has been much lower than 
in the prewar period. The conclusion is, I think, that in the field 
of industrial production the logical aim of the Marshall Plan must 
be to raise output above prewar levels. This can take place only 
over a period of time, as capital equipment is increased. Itis also 
probable that an increase in facilities is a necessary condition for a 
rise in the man-hour output to something like its prewar level. 
In the field of trade the picture is very different. In current 
prices, European trade is above the prewar· level, but in terms of 
1938 prices it remains substantially below that of 1939. The Bank 
of International Settlements Report states: "Expressed in real 
value, the trade of European countries with one another in 1947 
represented only 56 % of the prewar volume, while Europe's trade 
- in the non-European countries·amounted to 78% as regards exports
and 106 % as regards imports ______ ,, The relatively high level of im.:.
ports of course fa in good part attributable to American generosity.
The chief area in which thi� "deficiency" in intra-European 
trade appears is in the drop in German trade with Western 
Europe (something like one• billion dollars of trade in each di­
rection having disappeared), and secondarily in the shrinkage of 
trade flowing between western Europe and central and eastern 
European countries. The conclusion appears to be that a major ob­
jective of American policies must be an increased volume of 
European trade. Accomplishment of this goal will in turn be 
largely dependent upon the establishment of sound monetary con­
ditions, balanced budgets, and relaxation of. controls· upon foreign 
exch,ange and international commerce. These. problems of course 
are chiefly domestic problems for the countries concerned. Insofar 
as the· Marshall Plan does not induce or force attainment of these 
conditions it will not realize its potentialities. 
18 
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In some ways the major European problem is the loss to 
Europe, as the result of the war, of "invisible receipts" from 
foreign invesments, shipping, insurance, and so forth. The Bank 
of International Settlements Report states that in the period 1933-
1938, "The net income from Europe's investment in non-European 
countries was equal to about $1.4 milliard ... , .. and accounted for 
about one-quarter of Europe's total imports from non-European 
countries; iri 1947 the corresponding net income would seem to 
have been only $400 million, some 30 percent of what it was be­
fore the war." Here again the conclusion is plain. Unless 
Europe, during the period in which this country supplies aid, so 
reorganizes its economy as to adapt itself to these new conditions 
the Marshall Plan will fall short of its purposes. But this adapta­
tion is again essentially a domestic problem, or perhaps a com­
plex of domestic problems, for European countries. The Marshall 
Plan in and of itself here can do little more than buy time---time for 
the European economy to adjust itself. 
19 
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